Why we should take non-Brits from Guantanamo

Iain Dale asks why we should accept people who aren’t connected with Britain from Guantánamo Bay. These are my reasons why we should.

Firstly, it is in our strategic interest for two reasons. I will look at the morality and legality later, but it is enough to say that many states and people, friendly, neutral and hostile, regard both Guantánamo as immoral and the UK as very close to the United States. By acting to expedite the closing of Guantánamo, we are acting to right a perceived wrong. It also improves our standing within the EU and NATO if we can demonstrate an ability to act as an effective link or broker between the western and eastern sides of the Atlantic. I would add that there might well be (although I do not know this for a fact) people who would be repatriated to, say, Bosnia-Herzegovina. While I do not wish to impugn Bosnia-Herzegovina and am using it just as an example, I do not believe that it, or many other states, have the state-capacity to effectively monitor these people. If we look slightly more widely around the Balkans, the apparent ease with which people evaded the ICTY, I believe the point is proven. In the long-term, taking in detainees here is more secure than leaving them in limbo or Ruritania.

Secondly, it is expeditious. Whether Mr Dale likes it or not, President-Elect Obama has made it clear that Guantanamo is to be closed. As I mentioned, we are seen as close to the US in foreign policy terms. One of the big problems with Guantánamo was the lack of clarity as to what was going to happen to people held there. We now have a resolution; however, we will have to accept people who do not have an immediate connection to the US for a few reasons. One is that some states will not accept people who have a prior or stronger connection to them. We can exert more moral pressure on them to accept people from Guantánamo if we show how much we are doing; in any case, it will not work for everyone. There are some states that it would be wrong to ‘export’ these people to; they are those states that would torture them. They would go from a frying pan to a rather hotter fire and many of the problems we face because of Guantánamo would be reinforced.

Thirdly, it is morally right. Guantánamo was an abrogation of rights, poorly implemented and conceived, that took away some of our moral high ground and constitutes a serious threat to habeas corpus in the USA. Its closure rectifies at least some of those issues. Moreover, the USA is our friend and ally; if it seeks our support on this, given that the costs are minimal and the benefits great, I would have hoped it would have been a no-brainer.

If I may refer to the title of Iain’s post – “Guantánamo is a problem made in America” – I would contend that the problem may have been made there, but that does not relieve of us our obligations to justice and due process, or to our ally, or the effects its existence and the method of its closure may have on us.

In short, it is both morally right and in our strategic interest.

xD.

A brief note on Afghanistan

The UK’s commander in Helmand, Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, has said that we shouldn’t expect a decisive military victory in Afghanistan; I wholeheartedly agree. He should have added that there was never going to be a military victory in Afghanistan.

Setting up the Afghan government was never going to be enough, either. The international community needs to rally round and provide development support to build the institutions that will allow Afghanistan to run itself. A successful part of that has been the establishment of the Afghan National Army, which (I believe) now takes part in more than two-thirds of missions conducted under the ISAF or OEF banners. More work does need to be done, for instance, on the Afghan National Police. It is worth mentioning OMLTs (Operational Mentor Liaison Teams, or Omelettes), which remain attached to an Afghan unit after it has been set up and trained to provide ongoing training and advice.

NATO went into Afghanistan under an Article V1 commitment to prevent further attacks, on the US in particular, launched from Afghan territory by al Qaeda with the complicity of the then-government. The conflict was and is increasingly characterised by asymmetry; while there have been some ‘pitched battles’, insurgents are increasingly avoiding such conflicts. Instead, they are going after development work precisely because it is that work which wins hearts and minds and helps to develop the structures that Afghanistan needs. A good instance is the delivery of a hydroelectric power turbine to produce electricity for on the order of two million people. It took five thousand troops to safeguard its passage precisely because the Taleban were so determined to stop it arriving.

While the higher echelons of the Taleban are under pressure, local groups are able to maintain opposition. This is largely because they use aggressive means with no regard at all towards loss of life, Afghan or otherwise. It is worth remembering, though, that a couple of years ago the Taleban were talking in terms of defeating the Afghan government in some parts of the country. They have failed. While the situation is not necessarily what I’d describe as ‘good’, the Taleban are being defeated as a coherent force.

As I said at the beginning, there was never going to be a military victory in Afghanistan. What military force can do is allow and support the autonomous developments needed for Afghanistan to run itself and thus prevent further attacks like 9-11.

xD.

1 – Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, aka the Washington Treaty, runs:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Full text of the treaty at Wikisource.

PS – I draw your attention to the disclaimer at the bottom of this page.